I hate writing opinion pieces. I often wonder why in my teens and early twenties, I was fond of writing personal essays. Now I don’t even post on Facebook anything related to controversial issues, political or otherwise. It’s not that I’ve become apathetic. It’s just that I believe I now know why two cents’ worth is called so, and of course, I’d rather channel my rage against corruption, oppression, and the like into writing fiction.
It looks like, however, I have no choice but write something opinionated about Memorandum Circular 2010-119 issued by the Department of Interior and Local Government. I have strong feelings about certain parts of the order, and I tried to suppress the feelings, but like love, they didn’t let me sleep. (I should learn how to write better similes.)
I can see the goodness of the intentions that prompted the issuance of the DILG order. I even agree that indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples should be given mandatory representation in local legislative councils. Such affirmative action has been necessary for the longest time. I don’t believe, however, that the process indicated in the order is the way to do it.
The biggest thing that I find wrong in the order is in the requirements for a person to qualify as ICC/IP representative. The fourth item in the list states that the person should be an “acknowledged leader of the ICCs/IPs of which he or she is a member.” The provision presupposes that each ICC in the Philippines has a well-established political system, in other words, that it has a datu who functions in the same way as a barangay chairman does. In many villages, the IPs have been assimilated into the Christian population. They no longer recognize the powers of a datu, and they have been participating in the regular electoral process. Furthermore, in some tribes, such as the Dulangan Manobo of Kulaman Plateau, datus do not wield much power, now or then. As scholar Harland Kerr observed in the late 1950s, “With the territorial groups so small and relatively unstable, the authority of the Manobo datu does not approximate that of datus from more rigidly organized societies.” The problem doesn’t stop there. The DILG order also requires municipal and provincial legislative councils to have an ICC/IP representative, but as Kerr further observed, “A datu is the head of a territorial group, with little authority outside this group. For the most part his own people are the only ones willing to recognize his authority.” Some Dulangan Manobo leaders assume the title sultan, but those sultans don’t really have power over the datus (the way a governor has over mayors) or the territory that each of those sultans rule isn’t much bigger than the territory that a datu rules.
Because of the DILG order, some ICCs are forced to stage a “traditional” process of choosing their “leader.” Worse, in some localities, non-IPs who are in power simply select the IP who seems to be the most prominent in the community; it’s no longer the IPs themselves who choose their representative. This means that the legislative seat goes to the prominent IP who is close to the powerful non-IPs or who is capable of accomplishing the bureaucratic documentary requirements. This further means that if an IP wants to have the seat, he might focus on pleasing the powerful non-IPs instead of trying to prove to his people that he deserves to speak for them.
I’m not saying that these things are happening now in my town or province. I’m not singling out for criticism any locality. These things may have happened or may happen in any locality where the DILG order can take effect. Besides, nobody here except me seems unimpressed by the order. Others—non-IPs and IPs alike, leaders and ordinary residents alike—seem willing to comply without so many questions.
So why am I writing this? I guess I just want to warn the government (in the off chance that government officials stumble on this blog) that the ICC/IP representation system, or at least in its current form, will result in local disasters sooner or later. While I’m writing the first draft of this post actually, a disaster has started in a municipality next province; the IPs there are making a serious attempt to change their municipal representative. The ICC/IP representation system might meet the same fate that befell our country’s youth representation system, the Sangguniang Kabataan. If that happens, we will only be pushing our IP brothers and sisters farther into the margins.
So what do I suggest be done? The government, of course, must look into the flaws of the suggested process. I understand that the government wants to preserve the traditional ways of life of the IPs and to incorporate those ways in our general political system. But isn’t the datu system simply incompatible with democracy? We Filipinos, who have been victims of colonization and Martial Law, should have learned from history that an authoritarian rule ultimately does nothing for ordinary people. The datu system will ultimately do nothing for ordinary indigenous people. If we want our indigenous brothers and sisters to have a voice in the greater Philippine community, we must first allow them to have a voice within their own cultural community. We must let them choose their leader and representative in a democratic way. We must count the vote of each indigenous individual. (Our electoral process, of course, is likewise replete with problems, but I believe that it is a much lesser evil compared to vesting power on warlords or hereditary rulers.)
The datu system is unstable and unreliable. It can result to a violent competition, power vacuum, or mobocracy. It doesn’t help that DILG Memorandum Circular 2010-119 gives ICCs/IPs so much leeway when it comes to sharing the term of office (for localities that have more than one indigenous tribe) and ousting their representative. The DILG memo, quoting Administrative Order No. 001 series of 2009 issued by the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, states that the tribes in the local government unit “may agree on a term-sharing agreement based on population ratio, or on whatever local arrangement they may deem suited and applicable to address the cultural peculiarities in that LGU.” The memo further states, “The ICC/IP mandatory representative can be replaced anytime by the ICCs/IPs who selected him/her to the position in accordance with their local guidelines on recall or removal from office.”
Most likely, the ICCs/IPs who do not have an established process of selecting leaders do not also have an established process of term sharing and changing leaders. How do we expect them to execute the two courses of action in an organized manner? Also, the two courses of action are most likely not covered by the existing customary laws of ICCs/IPs and they will have to make the rules along the way. This means that they will be doing something new instead of keeping alive a traditional practice. There is nothing being preserved in this case. So why don’t we just make them adapt the democratic processes laid out in the laws of the land for the majority of the population?
I am not anti-IPs. Neither am I pro-IPs per se. I am pro-ordinary IPs. I am pro-ordinary people, IPs or otherwise. We must be careful how we try to preserve culture and promote diversity. We must make sure we don’t enthrone little kings and coddle local tyrants in the process. We must always keep in mind the welfare of ordinary IPs, the truly voiceless among the voiceless.
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